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Abstract
This paper shows the way how persistent world inﬂation shocks hitting a
small open economy can re-weight the importance of domestic and foreign
factors in the determination of prices. In this sense, we study why the re-
cently observed global disinﬂation environment may imply a weakening of the
standard interest rate chann e lo fm o n e t a r yp o l i c yt oa ﬀect inﬂation.
We derive a state-dependent Phillips curve based on translog preferences
that make the elasticity of substitution of domestic goods sensitive to for-
eign prices. With this approach we are able to replicate the dragging ef-
fect of global disinﬂa t i o no nd o m e s t i ci n ﬂation, as experienced in small open
economies such as New Zealand, Chile and Peru.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
As compared to decades gone, many economies are nowadays characterised by low inﬂation
environments. The reasons for this global disinﬂation phenomenon have been pointed out
by, among others, Andersen and Wascher (2001), Bowman (2003) and Rogoﬀ (2003). There
are several factors laying behind this scenario, such as structural changes in the inﬂation
processes, institutional factors (increasing central bank independence and strong commitment
to anti-inﬂationary strategies) and the increased competitiveness or market power hypothesis
in price setting behaviour. According to this hypothesis, both the rising globalisation and
deregulation witnessed worldwide in the 90’s have contributed to the fall in the market power
of price setting ﬁrms. As a result, inﬂation rates have been unusually persistent at very low
levels (below targets), barely reacting to expansionary monetary policies. This fact has been
particularly peculiar in small open economies such as New Zealand and Australia from 1997
to 1999 as well as Chile and Peru during the ﬁrst years of the 2000’s1.
There are at least two ways to tackle the increased competitiveness hypothesis. The ﬁrst
one is related to the behavior of markups vis-a-vis inﬂation. A pioneering result oﬀered in
Rotemberg and Woodford (1991) for a closed economy is that aggregate markups are counter-
cyclical2. This contrasts the views in Taylor (2000) and Jonsson and Palmqvist (2003) for
open economies, where lower inﬂation rates imply lower market power. In general, the markup
debate is not conclusive.
A convenient alternative route of analysis adopted in our paper is to leave aside the behaviour
of markups and note that the increased competitiveness hypothesis also relies on the rising
number of good varieties faced by consumers due to globalisation. The implication of this
casual observation is that consumers are more prone to substitute away their consumption
towards newer and cheaper goods3. The contribution of our paper hinges precisely on modelling
a simple mechanism explaining the change in the substitutability among imported and home
goods and their implications for aggregate inﬂation and monetary policy.
The usual device for modelling inﬂation dynamics is the well-known New Keynesian Phillips
Curve. Although its standard version has many advantages such as mathematical tractability,
it usually fails in replicating inﬂation persistence4.B e s i d e s ,i ti sc o m m o ne v e ni nt h en e w e s t
approaches, to assume that the demands for goods produced by monopolistic ﬁrms arise from
Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) preferences, which seems to be an inappropriate
assumption within the increased competitiveness context.
1More examples can be found in Rogoﬀ (2003).
2This means that booms represent periods of falling market power whereas recessions picture episodes of
rising market power. B´ enabeau (1992) and Banerjee and Russell (2003) also ﬁnd the negative relationship.
3See Kamada and Hirakata (2002) for an empirical overview of the increased competitiveness phenomenon
for the Japanese economy. For the USA, Broda and Weinstein (2004) ﬁnd that import prices have fallen faster
than what oﬃcial statistics suggest due to the increase in the imported goods varieties.
4Though, some proposals have arisen to overcome this limitation such as Mankiw and Reis (2001) sticky
information approach or Calvo et. al. (2003) rational inertia theory.
2We instead study inﬂation dynamics by means of a modelling tool that relies on translog
preferences leading to a state-dependent Phillips curve for a small open economy. The advan-
tage of the translog speciﬁcation over the widely used CES counterpart is that it allows the
demands for goods to depend on the prices of other goods and thereby making the price elas-
ticity of domestically produced goods dependent on price movements elsewhere. As pointed
out by Bergin and Feenstra (2000, 2001), the use of such an aggregator is useful to generate
endogenous persistence.
In the light of this type of preferences, a world disinﬂation environment characterised by fre-
quent disinﬂation shocks5, induces a strong strategic complementarity, namely, home producers
having to optimally follow up t h ew o r l dp r i c et r e n d 6. The identiﬁcation of this dragging ef-
fect of world inﬂation results crucial for the understanding of monetary policy in suﬃciently
small open economies. Once home inﬂation has been pushed down severely, monetary policy
has a mixed blessing: in one hand, it can enjoy the beneﬁto fl o ww o r l di n ﬂation and in the
other hand, it will soon learn that pushing up inﬂation with its standard domestic interest
rate instrument gets harder and harder. One obvious way to push up inﬂa t i o ni ns u c hc i r c u m -
stances is to use the one channel that gets stronger: the pass-through from the exchange rate
to inﬂation, precisely the way they might less be willing to be heading for.
Before proceeding, it is important to have a better grasp of the diﬀerences between the dragging
and the pass-through eﬀects. For a small open economy, world inﬂation ﬂuctuations quickly
hit tradable goods prices which are then - albeit with lags - aggregated out to aﬀect overall
inﬂation. This is the well-known pass-through eﬀect7 which does not directly impact on non-
tradable goods pricing. In contrast, if world inﬂation also aﬀects non-tradable goods prices,
the consequences for overall inﬂation are stronger. We dub this impact as the dragging eﬀect.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides some empirical evidence
to support the increased competitiveness hypothesis in three small open economies. Section 3
develops partial-equilibrium Phillips curve derivations based on both the CES and the translog
aggregator. In section 4 we perform world disinﬂation experiments to study the eﬀects upon
the variables of interest and in particular the power of monetary policy to aﬀect inﬂation8.
Section 5 contains our ﬁnal remarks and suggests some lines of further research.
2 Empirical motivation
The above discussion recalls the recurrent debate about the non-linearity of the Phillips curve.
As pointed out by Dupasquier and Ricketts (1998), several models of price-setting behaviour
5For example, the constant appearance of cheap foreign products competing with local ones or the constant
innovation in information-based products.
6See Bakhshi et. al. (2003) for a discussion on strategic complementarities in the presence of trend inﬂation.
7See Goldfjan and Ribeiro (2000) for a review of the pass-through literature.
8Throughout the paper, the term monetary policy power does not refer to the power to aﬀect aggregate
demand but the power to aﬀect inﬂation.
3suggest that the parameters of the Phillips curve are functions of macroeconomic conditions9
such as the level of inﬂation and, in an open economy, the real exchange rate10. These non-
linearities may lessen the accuracy of the traditional CES-based New Keynesian Phillips curve
as a sensible modelling and forecasting tool, particularly in small economies with signiﬁcant
disinﬂation episodes11.
To provide some empirical basis for this point, we perform a time-varying-parameter in-
ﬂation equation estimation for three small open economies with inﬂation-targeting regimes:
New Zealand, Chile and Peru. The empirical speciﬁcation is the following linear-homogenous
Phillips curve12
πt = atπt+1 +( 1− at)πt−1 + b0,t∆$t + b1,t∆$t−1 + c0,tπw,t + c1,tπw,t−1 + iid (1)
with random-walk coeﬃcients13
at = at−1 + iid
bj,t = bj,t−1 + iid for j =0 ,1
cj,t = cj,t−1 + iid for j =0 ,1
(2)
Quarterly data were obtained from the International Financial Statistics database and the
estimation sample includes the low inﬂation or disinﬂation years of the 90’s. In all cases,
we used the headline CPI inﬂation as the dependent variable πt and estimated the moving
parameters via Kalman ﬁltering14.
Two comments are worth-mentioning. First, the marginal cost indicator in [1] is the growth
rate of real wages ∆$t, so the parameter (b0,t + b1,t) is the slope of the Phillips curve. For
a robustness check, we tried alternative measures such as real output, unemployment or real
wage gaps and growth rates, with no qualitative diﬀerences in the results. Second, πw,t is the
foreign inﬂation expressed in local currency (i.e. plus nominal depreciation), so the sum of the
last two coeﬃcients in [1] (c0,t + c1,t)c a p t u r e st h epass-through eﬀect of foreign price shocks.
Figure [1] presents the estimated paths for the Phillips curve slopes together with the be-
haviour of relative prices, measured as the eﬀective real exchange rate (in logs)15.T h em o s t
9Amongst the most popular explanations of such asymmetries are signal extraction or misperceptions, ad-
justment costs, downward nominal wage rigidities and the presence of monopolistically competitive markets.
More details can be found in King and Watson (1994) and Clark and Laxton (1997).
10Another important condition for an open economy is studied in Razin and Yuen (2001). They analyse why
countries with greater restrictions on capital mobility tend to have steeper Phillips curves.
11See Ascari (2000) for further discussion.
12Equation [1] is similar to the equations derived in the theoretical model outlined in Section 3.
13The iid symbol must be understood henceforth as a zero-mean perturbation with constant variance and
independent on its own lags and leads as well as with any other variable.
14As they are treated as states variables in state-space framework. See Harvey (1989).
15We measure the real eﬀective exchange rate as the ratio of the domestic currency price index of foreign
goods to the domestic price index (so an increase in the ratio implies a real depreciation). The price index
of foreign goods is calculated using a weighted average of the price indices of main trade partners. We have
re-scaled the real exchange rate so it equals 100 (in levels) in the ﬁrst quarter of 1994.
4remarkable feature is the high correlation between these two indicators, which suggests that
the state-dependency of the Phillips curve slope is related to factors aﬀecting the real exchange
rate. The reason behind this ﬁnding is that in an open economy Phillips curve such as [1], the
slope parameter could be interpreted as a measure of the importance of domestic factors in the
formation of prices. A fall in the price of tradables or a rise in the price of non-tradables leads
to demand substitution, implying a higher share of tradable goods in domestic expenditure.
Therefore, foreign shocks disturbing tradable prices would become more important in equilib-
rium determination. As a result, the Phillips curve becomes more elastic (its slope falls). In
addition, Figure [2] depicts the time paths of the pass-through from foreign inﬂation to headline
inﬂation. As expected, the alluded path is negatively correlated with the real exchange rate16.
In a nutshell, we can see that movements in the real exchange rate are related to both the pass-
trough and the slope of the Phillips curve in opposite ways, and in so doing, they continuously
re-weight the contribution of external and domestic factors in the determination of prices and
inﬂation.
Given that the fall in the slope of the Phillips curve originated from relative price ﬂuctuations
ends up weakening a channel whereby domestic shocks aﬀect headline inﬂation, monetary
policy may lose eﬀectiveness. Regardless of the expectation or exchange rate transmission
mechanisms implied in the Phillips curve, monetary policy also aﬀects inﬂation through the
demand channel, so the lower the slope is, the weaker the standard interest rate instrument is.
In other words, the power of the interest rate instrument is inversely related to the dragging
eﬀect of world inﬂation17. We shall study this fact formally in the subsequent sections.
3 Theoretical derivation of inﬂation processes
In this section we analyse the relationship between the relative price of tradables to non-
tradables18 and the power of domestic factors (including monetary policy) to explain inﬂation.
The goal is to provide a theoretical framework consistent with the empirical ﬁndings provided
in section 2.
The framework set up here tries to be as simple as possible. The aim is to build a partial
equilibrium model to derive microfounded inﬂation equations to be used in the next section
where a stylised general equilibrium model is set up. The emphasis is on aggregation features
generated from two tentative assumptions for consumer preferences. Each one has diﬀerent
implications concerning the substitutability among goods and in turn, diﬀerent eﬀects on the
Phillips curve parameters. We work with two types of goods - a home, non-tradable good and
a world, tradable good - which enter into the consumption basket according to either a CES
16This result is in line with empirical ﬁndings in Goldfjan and Ribeiro (2000).
17In an open economy, it is known that the degree of price stickiness is lower due to the presence of imported
goods and nominal exchange rate ﬂuctuations. Since real eﬀects of monetary policy shocks occur mainly because
of nominal rigidities, the decline of monetary policy eﬀectiveness may be reﬂecting the decrease of overall price
stickiness implied by the dragging eﬀect.
18This ratio is the theoretical counterpart of the eﬀective real exchange rate used in the empirical section.
5(which will be treated as a benchmark) or translog aggregator. As mentioned, a key feature of
the translog speciﬁcation is that the implied price elasticities are state-dependent as opposed
to the CES case.
The price of the world good obeys the law of one price. That is, if P∗
t denotes the international
price of the world good and St is the nominal exchange rate, then the price in pesos19 of the
world good is Pw,t = StP∗
t . On the other side, to model stickiness in home prices, we adopt
the cost-of-changing-prices setup of Rotemberg (1982). This approach consists ﬁrst in ﬁnding
desired prices, as if having ﬁrms operating in a ﬂexible price environment, and then introducing
costs of adjustment to move observed prices towards the optimal ones.
Two further simplifying assumptions are made to derive analytically tractable inﬂation equa-
tions. The ﬁrst one is the linearity of the home good production function. This assumption
shuts oﬀ t h ed i r e c td e m a n de ﬀect on marginal costs and hence on prices20.S i n c et h ee ﬀect is
virtually the same under both aggregators, the gains from working with the standard concave
production function are negligible to our purpose. Moreover, provided that both preference
assumptions do not qualitatively make diﬀerence in the sensitive parts of marginal costs, we
assume a given labour demand. The second assumption is that we deﬁne real domestic wages
in terms of the home price rather than the consumption price. This assumption allows us to
derive inﬂation equations that are easy to handle and interpret.
Throughout the document, lower cases of both real quantities and prices refer to the natural
logarithms of the respective upper cases. Also, the h and w subscripts refer to home and world
variables respectively. The details of the analytical derivations are outlined in the Appendix.
3.1 Inﬂation dynamics with a CES aggregator
Preferences and aggregation
Under the CES consumption aggregator, the consumption of the home good Ch,t depends
n e g a t i v e l yo ni t so w np r i c ePh,t and positively on the aggregate consumption Ct. Speciﬁcally,
ch,t =l n( 1− α) − η(ph,t − pt)+ct (3)
where pt is the log aggregate CPI. In this equation η > 1 measures the degree of substitutability
between the two goods and α ∈ h0,1i is usually interpreted as the degree of openness21.
It is easy to show that if the steady-state relative price level Ph,t/Pw,t is constant and uniquely
equal to one, the consumer-based price inﬂation can be approximated by
πt =( 1− α)πh,t + απw,t (4)
19We will refer to the local currency of our small open economy simply as the ”peso”.
20In the standard New-Keynesian Phillips curve, price dynamics is aﬀected by real marginal cost movements,
which in turn, is aﬀected by aggregate demand.
21See, for instance, Romer (1993).
6The overall inﬂation dynamics does depend on α but not on η. Thus, under CES preferences,
the degree of goods substitutability plays no fundamental role in aggregate dynamics.
World inﬂation
World inﬂation follows a simple AR(1) process,
π∗
t =( 1− ρ)π + ρπ∗
t−1 + ²t with ²t ∼ iid (5)
where |ρ| < 1a n dπ is the steady-state world inﬂation rate.
It is important to recall that the world inﬂation expressed in pesos πw,t appearing in [4] is
given by ∆st + π∗
t.
Home ﬁrms and ﬂexible price setting
The domestic good producer is endowed with monopolistic power and sets its price accordingly.
Production Yh,t is made with a technology that exhibits constant returns on labour. So, for
given nominal wages Wt, the total nominal cost is
Costh(Yh,t)=WtYh,t (6)
Every period, the domestic producer chooses its price to maximise proﬁts,
max
Ph,t
[B(Ph,t)=Ph,tYh,t(Ph,t) − Costh(Yh,t(Ph,t))] (7)
G i v e nt h a ti ne q u i l i b r i u mYh,t = Ch,t, the optimal price decision reduces to the standard
markup pricing over marginal cost. If we take logs to the markup pricing equation we obtain
the working expression
pces
h,t =l nµ + wt (8)
where µ is the ﬂexible-price markup µ =
η
η−1.
As we may note later, the diﬀerentiated expression for pces
h,t is a key variable that feeds into the
inﬂation processes and is simply deﬁned as
∆pces
h,t = ∆wt (9)
Introducing price rigidity
Now we suppose that ﬁrms cannot set their desired optimal price due to the existence of
adjustment costs. As Rotemberg (1982), we assume that the monopolistic ﬁrm maximises
proﬁts net of the loss it incurs by inducing variability in its price path.
We perform a quadratic approximation of the monetary beneﬁto ft h eﬁrm (equation [7])
around the ﬂexible price equilibrium (the price level that maximizes beneﬁts in the absence
7of adjustment costs, pces
h,t). After introducing adjustment costs, the ﬁrm’s problem can be


















where β ∈ h0,1i is the ﬁrm’s discount factor and Et is the expectation operator.
The positive constant c as well as the log of the previous period price ph,t−1 are known at time
t. This type of dynamic problem and its solution has been neatly outlined in Sargent (1979)
a n da p p l i e dt oi n ﬂation dynamics by Batini et. al. (2002). However, our set up is diﬀerent
as we do not model a continuum of homogeneous agents but just one domestic ﬁrm endowed
with market power. Thus, the price aggregation we perform is diﬀerent.
















∆$t + ξt (11)
where ∆$t is the growth of real wages deﬁned as $t = wt−ph,t. The term ξt is a combination
of iid forecast errors and is treated as a shock.
The aggregate inﬂation process
It is straightforward to plug [11] into the aggregator [4] to obtain
πt = a0Et [πt+1]+( 1− a0)πt−1 + aslope∆$t (12)












a2 =( 1 − α)
Under suitable values for the structural parameters α, β, c, ρ, the Phillips curve coeﬃcients
are all positive and less than unity.
The result is a standard hybrid Phillips curve with the following features: (i) it has a dynamic
linear homogeneity property implying nominal neutrality in the long run; (ii) it depends on
the real marginal cost deﬁned by ∆$t and on the expectation shock ξt; and (iii) it depends
on the world price inﬂation.
Consider now a world inﬂation shock (²0 = 1). According to [12] and [5], if we abstract from
nominal exchange rate or other endogenous movements, the response on impact22 of aggregate
22In the pre-shock period, π−1 = ∆$−1 = πw,−1 =0 . T h es h o c ki m p l i e st h a tπw,0 =1+∆s0.T h e n ,
the response on impact over inﬂation is π0 = a0 ((1 − α)Et [πh,1]+αEt [πw,1]) + α[1 + ∆s0 − a0Et [πw,1]] =
a0(1 − α)Et [πh,1]+α(1 + ∆s0).
8inﬂation is α. In the absence of other perturbations the shock will be partially corrected in
the subsequent periods as πw,t reverts to its long-run value, due to the presence of the term
−α(1 − a0)πw,t−1. Further, it is useful to recall equation [11] and note that the shock per se
does not aﬀect home prices23.T h e w o r l d i n ﬂation aﬀects the aggregate inﬂation by a direct
pass-through eﬀect.
3.2 Inﬂation dynamics with a translog aggregator
Preferences and inﬂation aggregation
With two consumption goods, the aggregate log price pt is deﬁned as





In this aggregator, the parameters α ∈ h0,1i and γ > 0 are such that both goods enter sym-
metrically in consumption preferences. Also, homogeneity in the demand functions is imposed.
Since the translog can be understood as an augmented CES aggregator24, the parameter α is
the same as in [3].
The log of the compensated demand for the domestic good is
ch,t =l n( 1− α + γqt) − (ph,t − pt)+ct (14)
This demand function diﬀers from that under the CES speciﬁcation in an important way: it
depends on the relative price of the world good to the home good qt,d e ﬁned as qt = pw,t−ph,t.
In the long-run qt is constant and, for convenience, we set its steady-state value to zero. This
measure proves essential in the derivation of the time-varying coeﬃcients of the Phillips curve
and hence on the power of monetary policy to aﬀect inﬂation via changes in marginal costs.
The aggregation of inﬂa t i o ni sa c h i e v e db yd i ﬀerencing equation [13], which leads to
πt =( 1− αt)πh,t + αtπw,t (15)
This expression resembles equation [4] for the CES case. However, the weights are time-
varying now. In this case αt = α − 1
2γ (qt + qt−1), so the inﬂation process is a changing
weighted average of domestic and foreign inﬂation25. As the relative price of the world good
falls, qt turns negative and therefore, world inﬂation gradually becomes more important to the
determination of overall inﬂation.
23In a general equilibrium setting, domestic inﬂation would respond to changes in ∆$t generated, for instance,
b yap o l i c yr e a c t i o nt ot h ee x t e r n a ls h o c k .
24See Deaton and Muellbauer (1980).
25A note of caution: For the shares of either home or world good expenditure to be bounded between zero
and one, we require both γ and qt not to be too large. Empirically and for practical purposes, these conditions
always hold.
9Home ﬁrms and ﬂexible price setting
Under translog aggregation, the non-tradable ﬁrm takes into account the fact that the demand
for its good depends on the world good price. Then, the expression for the optimal change in









N a m e l y ,t h eo p t i m a lp r i c ec h a n g e∆ptrans
h,t is a simple average of world inﬂation and marginal
costs growth.
Introducing price rigidity























where ζt is an iid shock.
This equation is quite diﬀerent from that in the CES case in [11]. In particular, home inﬂation
depends positively on world inﬂation26. To prevent consumers from substituting away the
consumption of home goods, the home producer will ﬁnd optimal to follow up the world trend,
so the falling world inﬂation drags home inﬂation27.
The aggregate inﬂation process
It is now straightforward to aggregate the inﬂation dynamics plugging [17] into [15] to get
πt = a0E [πt+1]+a1πt−1 +( 1− a0 − a1)πw,t + aslope,t∆$t (18)

















a2,t =1 − αt
26The degree of dependence is captured by the adjustment cost parameter c. When adjustments costs are
high (c is small), the degree of dependence weakens and the situation is close to the CES case.
27I nt h eo p p o s i t ec a s e ,w h e nt h ew o r l dp r i c ei n c r e a s e s ,i ti so nt h ei n t e r e s to ft h ep r o ﬁt-maximising producer
to also increase its price against the backdrop of a higher demand for the non-tradable good.
10The above Phillips curve not only has the basic properties of [12] but also unambiguously
captures important features of the empirical section. The slope aslope,t depends negatively
on αt, the share of the imported good in the consumption basket, whereas the pass-through
coeﬃcient is directly related to αt.S i n c eαt increases as the relative price qt decreases, a drop
of external prices (relative to home prices) causes the slope of the Phillips curve to fall and the
pass-through coeﬃcient to rise. The resizing of the weights in favour of the external components
of the Phillips curve after the disinﬂation shock, exerts a more interesting dynamics to aggregate
inﬂation. Besides and perhaps more importantly, the shock directly aﬀects home price-setting,
magnifying the response of aggregate inﬂation. Hence, in this case the pass-through eﬀect of
world price ﬂuctuations is reinforced by the existence of the dragging eﬀect.
4 Monetary policy analysis
In this section we embed the two types of inﬂation equations into a stylised, quarterly semi-
structural model. Then, we shock the system to study the policy implications of the dragging
eﬀect.
4.1 A simple framework
Equation [19] below establishes the link between the monetary policy interest rate instrument
it and the growth of real wages
∆$t = b$∆$t−1 +( 1− b$)Et [∆$t+1] − br(it − Et [πt+1] − r)+²$,t (19)
where r is the equilibrium real interest rate (assumed ﬁxed), b$ ∈ h0,1i and br > 0. Typically
this equation is speciﬁed in terms of the output gap and is interpreted as an IS curve28.
However, in the absence of demand eﬀects due to the assumed linearity of the production
function, marginal costs solely depend on the real wage rate. The important feature of equation
[19] is the negative relation between the real interest rate (gap) and the indicator of marginal
cost used in our setup.
Equation [20] describes a plausible monetary policy rule that incorporates a concern about
deviations of future expected inﬂation rates from the target29 π and the measure30 ∆$t.






Et [πt+j] − π

 + fw∆$t + ²i,t (20)
where all coeﬃcients are positive.
28See Clarida et.al. (1999)
29Inﬂation deviations enters the policy reaction function as a year-on-year ﬁgure. This not only smoothes the
interest rate paths but is also consistent with the behaviour of a typical inﬂation targeter.
30We use this measure instead of a gap measure ($t − $)b e c a u s e∆$t appears as a direct inﬂation deter-
minant.
11Equation [21] is the deﬁnition of the relative price process
qt = qt−1 +
1
4
(πw,t − πh,t) (21)
Exchange rate dynamics is embedded into the model in two alternative forms,
st =













We choose these alternatives given the fact that there is no macroeconomic consensus about
the correct nominal exchange rate model. However, despite our ignorance about how exchange
rate dynamics actually evolves, we will show that the dragging eﬀect is robust to exchange
rate model uncertainty.
These two alternative speciﬁcations in [22] represent two extremes regarding the way the
exchange rate adjusts to shocks. In the PPP model, the exchange rate moves only insofar
as the real exchange rate is misaligned (i.e. whenever there are deviations from purchasing
parity or disequilibria in the goods market). The parameter χ measures the speed of nominal
exchange rate adjustments to real exchange rate deviations from its zero long-run steady-state
value. Under this setting, the exchange shows a smoother and somewhat persistent dynamics.
Also note that there will be no response on impact, since st depends on lagged values of qt.
In contrast, in the UIP case the spot exchange rate is a jump variable reacting to future
expected values embedded in the interest rate diﬀerentials. Whenever current and expected
interest rate diﬀerentials diverge too much, the spot exchange rate reacts in a manner that
the non-arbitrage condition holds. Hence, to avoid undue jumps in the spot exchange rate, we
allow the world nominal interest rate to move in response to world inﬂation shocks. Insofar as
domestic and world interest rates will tend to move in the same direction, the spot exchange
rate jump will not be magniﬁed. This means that falling world inﬂation will decrease the
world rate31. In addition, it is worth mentioning that in general, the UIP model renders a
more volatile exchange rate than the PPP model, with a non-zero response on impact.
The model also includes the law of motion of world inﬂation deﬁned in equation [5] and
is completed with a Phillips curve derived either for the CES-based (equation [12]) or the
translog-based (equation [18]) framework.
We assume arbitrary but reasonable values for the model coeﬃcients. In particular, in equation
[19] we set b$ =0 .7a n dbr =0 .5. In the policy rule [20], we choose the values fp =1 .5a n d
fw =0 .5. For the exchange rate equation [22] we use χ =0 .36 which implies a half-life of
a misalignment of about a year. Also, we set f∗
p =0 .4 which implies that the world interest
rate reacts less than one-for-one to world inﬂation shocks. On the other hand, we consider
31In fact, the term in braces in the UIP model in [22] states that the world interest rate is set by the simple
policy rule i
∗





12a steady-state real interest rate r equal to 3 percent (which implies a value β =0 .97) and a
yearly steady-state inﬂation rate π equal to 2.5 percent. For the world inﬂation process, we
make the autoregressive parameter ρ =0 .5 which implies that the eﬀect of a shock dies away
in about a year.
For the CES case, the parameter that measures the degree of openness α is set to 0.35, which
roughly corresponds to the Chilean and Peruvian ﬁgures. For the translog case, the value of
α is repeated while γ = 1. Finally, the parameter c is set such that the slopes of both Phillips
curves are equal in steady state32.
4.2 The exercise
We perform two experiments regarding the way world disinﬂation may hit an economy initially
resting on its steady state33.W e ﬁr s te v a l u a t eao n e - p e r i o d - o n l yd i s i n ﬂation shock ²0 that
brings world inﬂation from π =2 .5 to 1 percent on impact. This shock will illustrate the
dynamics of the model. Second, we hit world inﬂation such that the level of world inﬂation
remains at 1 percent for a year (4 quarters)34. Through this type of persistent shock we try
to replicate the global disinﬂation phenomenon. We then compare the responses of the model
variables under the two speciﬁcations for the Phillips curve35. We perform this exercise with
the PPP model and then repeat the procedure with the UIP model.
The PPP Model
The results for inﬂa t i o na r ed i s p l a y e di nF i g u r e[ 3 ]w h e r et h eﬁrst row depicts the responses
under the one-quarter shock and the second, under the persistent one-year shock. The responses
are consistent with the reasoning laid out in the theoretical section above. The CES speciﬁ-
cation produces a moderate fall while the translog case generates a deeper drop in aggregate
inﬂa t i o n .T h eh o m ei n ﬂation behaviour provides a better insight. We observe that it remains
basically unperturbed in the CES case while the translog home inﬂation reacts in the same
direction as the world inﬂation shock. In this case the falling world inﬂation drags the home
inﬂation down, a fact that becomes even more apparent under the persistent shock.
In Figure [4] we show the eﬀect on other three key variables for monetary policy: the real
wage growth rate, the nominal interest rate and the nominal depreciation. Under both types
of shocks, the monetary policy rule calls for a stronger, expansionary response of the policy
instrument in the more disinﬂationary environment, i.e the translog case. The stronger re-
sponse of interest rates in turn implies a stronger eﬀect upon the real wage growth. It is
32This means that if we set c = c









33To solve the rational expectations equilibrium, we use the algorithm outlined in Klein (2000).
34To do this we simulate the model subject to the following history of world inﬂation shocks:
²j =
( 1 − π for j =0
(1 − ρ)²0 for j =1 ,2,3
0o t h e r w i s e
35Additionally, we shocked the model considering diﬀerent sizes and signs for the shocks in order to exploit
the non-linearities in [18]. Although we did ﬁnd diﬀerences in the responses of the endogenous variables, none
of them were sizeable enough to be reported.
13remarkable that although monetary policy performs in an unduly expansionary way, the eﬀect
upon inﬂation is ﬂimsy.
In Figure [5] we plot the reasons behind the weakening of monetary policy in the translog
setting: the eﬀect of the shocks upon the slope of the Phillips curve aslope,t and the pass-
through parameter αt. Under both transitory and permanent shocks, the slope of the Phillips
curve co-moves with the relative price whereas the pass-through moves in the opposite direction.
Both, the reduction of the Phillips curve slope and the increase in pass-through reinforce the
dragging eﬀect vis-a-vis the reduction of monetary policy power.
These results are in line with the two key features observed in the empirical part: the positive
correlation between the slope of the Phillips curve and the real exchange rate and the negative
correlation between the pass-through and this relative price.
The UIP Model
In Figures [6] and [7] we present the responses of the diﬀerent variables under the UIP model.
It is important to recall that the main diﬀerence relative to the previous results is originated
in the response of the nominal exchange rate. As it can be seen, the shock causes a strong
depreciation on impact, since a cut in the interest rate as a policy reaction is anticipated.
The depreciation of the nominal exchange rate more than oﬀsets the shock so that the world
inﬂation in pesos raises. Under translog preferences, this leads to an increase in the domestic
inﬂation and, ﬁnally, turns into a higher aggregate inﬂation.
Nonetheless, after the shock, the dragging eﬀect operates and the results are qualitatively the
same as the ones obtained in the PPP model. Note, however, that the huge depreciation
on impact under the persistent shock calls for a subsequent appreciation that magniﬁes the
dragging eﬀect of the disinﬂation shock.
5 Final remarks
This paper provides a simple theoretical explanation of how the current world disinﬂation might
have dragged down domestic inﬂation levels in some small open economies. In particular, we
empirically ﬁnd such an eﬀect in New Zealand, Chile and Peru during the last decade. We
argue that globalisation and the increasing availability of cheaper foreign goods make world
prices ever more important to the price setting of domestic non-tradable goods. This is what
we call the dragging eﬀect.
The dragging eﬀect causes the contribution of domestic factors on aggregate inﬂation to reduce
due to demand substitution in favour of foreign goods. Since domestic expenditure in tradable
goods increases relative to that of non-tradables, the usual demand (interest rate) channel of
monetary policy also loses importance in the determination of prices. Thus, monetary policy
suﬀers a loss of eﬀectiveness to aﬀect inﬂation.
14We argue that translog preferences are able to capture the strategic complementarity that
leads to the dragging eﬀect. In our disinﬂation experiments, translog preferences fare better
than the usual CES preferences, since the latter cannot replicate the follow up behaviour in
price setting. To follow up is the best action home price setters can do to avoid loosing market
share in an increasingly competitive environment.
A natural extension of the paper is to move the model economy towards a more detailed general
equilibrium framework to better understand the impact of the dragging eﬀect. For instance,
to have a better insight of the labour market and its relation to marginal costs. In this case,
a shock that pushes down the relative price of tradables to non-tradables might expand the
demand in the tradable sector and reduce that of the non-tradable sector. This could lower
non-tradable sector real wages (relative to those of the tradable sector) and hence reduce home
good prices, making the dragging eﬀect even more pronounced than what is suggested here.
The existence of the dragging eﬀect has important consequences for monetary policy in small
open economies, since it can lead the economy to a low-inﬂation trap. In this circumstance, the
direct interest channel is barely useful and the pass-through gains strength, so policy makers
may ﬁnd convenient to induce exchange rate depreciation as a way out of the trap.
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17Appendix A: Flexible price setting
The CES case

















where Ch,t and Cw,t denote the quantity of domestic and imported goods respectively. Standard
intratemporal choice condition for the home good implies






which is the version in levels of [3] in the main text.
After imposing the condition Yh,t = Ch,t and replacing equations [6] and [A2] in [7] we obtain
the monetary proﬁts














w h i c hi st h ev e r s i o ni nl e v e l so f[ 8 ] .
T h et r a n s l o gc a s e
We ﬁrst deﬁne the log expenditure function as a sum of log aggregate consumption and log
consumption-based price index:
et= ct+pt (A5)
Given that we are only treating a two-goods case, the price aggregator pt is deﬁned as equation
[13],


















(1 − α + γqt)( A 7 )
After replacing the version in levels of identity [A5] we obtain the demand for the home good






which is the version in levels of [14]. In this case, the proﬁt function is















Equation [A10] cannot be solved explicitly for Ptrans
h,t since qt depends on ptrans
h,t =l n ( Ptrans
h,t ).





















After diﬀerentiation of [A12] we get equation [16] in the text.
19Appendix B: Price setting with adjustment costs
The quadratic approximation of the monetary proﬁt (equation [7]) around its desired price
level P∗
































> 0. The linear term disappears due to the optimality of
P∗
h,t while the constant term is irrelevant to the ﬁrms’ decision-making.
On the other hand, the adjustment costs for price changes are given by
AdjCost = cb (ph,t − ph,t−1)
2 (B1)
Therefore, in the presence of adjustment costs, the ﬁrm pricing problem can be reformulated









































+( Etph,t − Etph,t−1) − β (Etph,t+1 − Etph,t)=0 ( B 3 )
The operator Et is the expectation conditional on the information set accumulated up to time
t when the pricing decision is made. Equation [B3] describes the optimal price plan of the ﬁrm.
On the basis of the information set, the lagged price level ph,t−1 is a predetermined variable
while the ﬁrm sets ph,t = Etph,t which is actually observed. If we want to track the actual






+( ph,s − ph,s−1) − β (Esph,s+1 − ph,s)=0 f o rs = t,t +1 ,... (B4)
Due to rational expectations, the next period price forecasting error based on this period
information set is an iid sequence of random variable, Esph,s+1 − ph,s+1 = 2c
β ξs+1.R e p l a c i n g
and reordering conveniently yields
20·
1 −

















where L denotes the lag operator, Ljph,t = ph,t−j. Following Sargent (1979), the lag-polynomial
in brackets can be factorized as
·
1 −







=( 1− λ1L)(1− λ2L)
This factorization implies that
λ1 + λ2 =





The standard solution for the roots of this polynomial are such that 0 < λ1 < 1a n dλ2 > 1
β:
one stable solution and the other explosive. Upon inspection of the above two equations in λ1
and λ2,i ti se a s yt ov e r i f yt h a t :
βλ2
1 +1− 2cλ1 =( 1+β)λ1 (B6)
Replacing the factorized polynomial and multiplying by (1 − λ2L)
−1 allows us to get




























The transversality condition makes d = 0, so we can express the price decision as













This is the key solution to the problem. To derive an inﬂation process, we forward [B7] one
period, take time t expectations and multiply by βλ1,
36Note that since λ2 > 1 the expansion is (1 − λ2L)































πh,t = βλ1Etπh,t+1 + λ1πh,t−1 +2 cλ1∆p∗
h,t + iid (B9)
The optimal price p∗
h,t depends on the consumption aggregator assumed.
The CES case
A c c o r d i n gt oe q u a t i o n[ 9 ] ,∆p∗
h,t = ∆pces
h,t = ∆wt = ∆$t + πh,t, so that equation [B9], after





πh,t = βλ1Etπh,t+1 + λ1πh,t−1 +2 cλ1∆$t + βλ1εt (B10)
Considering equation [B6] allows us to obtain equation [11] in the main text that does not
depend on λ1 due to the assumed linearity of the production function. It is now straightforward
to aggregate the inﬂation dynamics to get the overall inﬂation rate using the aggregator in [4].
T h et r a n s l o gc a s e













πh,t = βλ1Etπh,t+1 + λ1πh,t−1 + cλ1πw,t + cλ1∆$t + βλ1εt (B11)
Again, the equality [B6] permits us to simplify equation [B11] into [17]. Then, after aggregating
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Figure 2: Pass-through and real exchange rate









































































































Figure 3: Inﬂation responses to transitory and persistent shocks to world inﬂation (PPP case).
















































































































Figure 4: Real wage growth, interest rate and exchange rate responses to transitory and
persistent shocks to world inﬂation (PPP case).

































































































Figure 5: Time-varying parameters with transitory and persistent shocks to world inﬂation
(PPP case).











































































































Figure 6: Inﬂation responses to transitory and persistent shocks to world inﬂation (UIP case).














































































































Figure 7: Real wage growth, interest rate and exchange rate responses to transitory and
persistent shocks to world inﬂation (UIP case).

































































































Figure 8: Time-varying parameters with transitory and persistent shocks to world inﬂation
(UIP case).
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